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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
Appellant Jamie Lichtenstein alleges that her 
employer, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC),
1
 
terminated her employment in violation of the Family 
                                              
1
 Our reference to UPMC throughout this opinion, unless 
otherwise indicated, is a collective reference to all four 
defendants in this case, including UPMC Presbyterian 
Shadyside, UPMC Braddock, and Deborah Lidey. 
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Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et 
seq.  The District Court granted summary judgment to UPMC 
on Lichtenstein‘s retaliation and interference claims.  
Lichtenstein‘s challenge to the District Court‘s decision 
requires us to consider (a) the specificity of information 
employees must provide to adequately notify employers of 
unforeseeable FMLA leave, and (b) the nature of a pretext 
analysis when a legitimate justification for terminating an 
employee pre-existed that employee‘s exercise of FMLA 
rights.  Based on the evidence in this case, genuine factual 
disputes exist about whether Lichtenstein‘s notice was 
adequate, whether her invocation of FMLA rights was a 
negative factor precipitating her termination, and whether 
UPMC‘s proffered justification for its action was mere 
pretext for retaliation.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court‘s grant of summary judgment on both claims 
and remand for further proceedings. 
   
II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Jamie Lichtenstein began working with UPMC in 
October 2005 as a research associate at UPMC‘s Western 
Psychiatric Institute and Clinic.  In September 2007, 
Lichtenstein transferred to UPMC‘s hospital in Braddock, 
Pennsylvania (―Braddock‖) where, less than four months 
later, she was discharged.  During her short tenure at 
Braddock, Lichtenstein worked as a psychiatric technician 
under the supervision of Deborah Lidey.  Because this was a 
new position for her, Lichtenstein was subject to a six-month 
probationary period in which UPMC‘s progressive discipline 
policy did not apply.  
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Although Lichtenstein received a merit-based raise to 
her salary in October 2007, her time at Braddock was 
tarnished by attendance problems and scheduling difficulties.  
From October through the end of December, Lichtenstein was 
tardy six times, absent twice, and requested changes to her 
schedule on multiple occasions after the deadline for 
requesting such changes had passed.  The most egregious 
incident during this time occurred on December 1st, a day 
which Lichtenstein was scheduled to work a sixteen-hour 
shift.  In the days preceding December 1st, two co-workers 
complained that Lichtenstein was planning to call-off if she 
could not find a replacement.  One of these co-workers told 
Lidey that Lichtenstein claimed she needed the day off to do 
school work
2
 and/or attend a concert.  Lichtenstein‘s co-
workers were upset because UPMC policy prohibited 
premeditated call-offs, and one of them might have to fill in 
for her if she did not show up.  In response to these 
complaints, Lidey emailed Lichtenstein for an explanation.  
Lichtenstein told Lidey she was hoping to take December 1st 
off because it was the only day she could work on a group 
project for school.  Although Lidey denied this request, 
Lichtenstein (alleging she was sick) called off. 
   
In her deposition, Lidey indicated that Lichtenstein‘s 
December 1st call-off was the moment when she first 
considered firing her.  According to Lidey, ―I had already 
made many accommodations in her schedule, and I had in my 
mind, if she calls off, then we can‘t further this.‖  App. at 
                                              
2
 In addition to her full-time position at Braddock, 
Lichtenstein was also a part-time student.  During her job 
interview, Lidey told Lichtenstein that UPMC would attempt 
to accommodate her school schedule. 
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331.  Lidey did not, however, terminate Lichtenstein for the 
incident, nor did she issue a written warning.  Lichtenstein‘s 
employment thus continued and arguably had a bright spot in 
the days before Christmas when Lidey sent an email thanking 
her for volunteering to fill people‘s shifts on both Christmas 
Eve and Christmas Day.  Less than three weeks later, on 
January 10, 2008, Lidey informed Lichtenstein that her 
employment was terminated. 
  
While it is undisputed that UPMC terminated 
Lichtenstein for attendance problems and scheduling 
difficulties, the parties vigorously dispute the event, or ―final 
straw,‖ that triggered the termination.  According to UPMC, 
the final straw occurred on December 30th, when—according 
to UPMC‘s time logs—Lichtenstein arrived at work several 
hours late and departed several hours early.  Although this 
incident was not recorded on Lichtenstein‘s staff log,3 and 
although Lidey was unable to recall when she first learned 
about it,
4
 UPMC insists this incident was the trigger for 
Lichtenstein‘s termination.  UPMC further asserts that the 11-
day delay between this December 30th incident and 
Lichtenstein‘s termination can be explained by the following 
                                              
3
 The staff log was maintained by Amy Harris, UPMC‘s 
administrative assistant for scheduling.  The ―time log,‖ on 
the other hand, was maintained through UPMC‘s 
computerized system.  As discussed below, the staff log is the 
document Lidey reviewed prior to terminating Lichtenstein, 
and is the document UPMC submitted to the EEOC as 
―Exhibit M‖ to document Lichtenstein‘s attendance problems.   
 
4
 When asked when she first learned of the December 30th 
incident, Lidey stated ―I can‘t remember that.‖  App. at 344. 
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two facts: (1) Lidey went on vacation on December 31st and 
did not return until January 7th, and (2) Lidey‘s plan to fire 
Lichtenstein on January 8th was thwarted by Lichtenstein‘s 
request for leave that morning. 
   
 To support its assertion that Lidey made the 
termination decision prior to leaving for vacation on 
December 31, UPMC relies entirely on Lidey‘s own 
testimony.  In her deposition, Lidey stated that she made the 
decision to terminate Lichtenstein before January 3rd.  Id. at 
344.  Lidey also testified that prior to terminating employees 
she always consults with Helene Brown, the head of Human 
Resources.  When asked when she first spoke with Brown 
about terminating Lichtenstein, Lidey stated that it was 
―before the New Year‘s.‖  Id. at 345.  Elsewhere, however, 
Lidey contradicted herself on both of these points.  The 
following are other answers Lidey gave when asked about the 
date she decided to fire Lichtenstein: 
 
Q. ―Had you made the decision to terminate 
[Lichtenstein] before you went on leave?‖ 
A. ―I would have to go back and look at dates.‖  Id. at 
331. 
 
Q: ―Was [the termination decision made] before you 
went on leave?‖  
A: ―I can‘t remember dates.‖  Id. at 345.   
Similarly, when asked to clarify when she first spoke with 
Helene Brown, Lidey provided the following responses: 
 
Q: ―Did you start your discussions with [Human 
Resources] after you came back 
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from leave or before you went on leave?‖  
A: ―I don‘t remember that.‖  Id. at 328.   
 
Q: ―Was there a discussion with Human Resources in 
December of 2007 before you went on leave to 
terminate Jamie Lichtenstein?‖  
A: ―I cannot remember the exact date.‖  Id. at 332.   
 
Q: ―Did you talk to HR before . . . January 7, 2008?‖  
A: ―I don‘t remember that.‖  Id. at 331. 
 
Helene Brown was also unable to recall when she and Lidey 
first discussed Lichtenstein‘s termination.  Id. at 423.  Brown 
could only recall that it was before January 8th and could not 
remember whether it was before, or after, Lidey went on 
leave.  Id.   
 
Lichtenstein‘s first scheduled shift after Lidey went on 
leave was January 3, 2008 at 3:00 p.m.  Lichtenstein did not 
make her shift that day, however, because early that morning 
her mother was rushed to the hospital in an ambulance after 
collapsing from a sudden excruciating pain in her leg.  When 
Lichtenstein arrived at the emergency room she saw her 
mother crying from the pain.  She had never seen her mother 
crying as she was that morning and Lichtenstein tried her best 
to comfort her.  Although unnerved, Lichtenstein called 
UPMC‘s nursing supervisor prior to noon to say she couldn‘t 
make her shift.
5
  During the phone call, Lichtenstein told the 
                                              
5
 It is undisputed that by calling the nursing supervisor when 
she did on January 3rd, Lichtenstein followed UPMC‘s 
proper procedure for calling off sick.  See App. at 308, 395–
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supervisor she ―was currently in the emergency room, that my 
mother had been brought into the hospital via ambulance, and 
I would be unable to work that day.‖  Id. at 211.  UPMC was 
able to find someone to take Lichtenstein‘s shift and Cynthia 
Krautz (Lidey‘s replacement while she was away) emailed 
Lidey to inform her that Lichtenstein had called off.  
Although Krautz‘s email did not indicate a reason for 
Lichtenstein‘s call-off, Amy Harris (UPMC‘s employee in 
charge of staff scheduling) marked the absence in 
Lichtenstein‘s staff log as ―sick mom.‖  Id. at 585. 
  
Lichtenstein‘s mother‘s condition was serious.  
Doctors diagnosed her as suffering from disc hernia, 
myopathy, and nerve impingement, and she remained 
hospitalized until January 8th.  During this hospital stay, 
Lichtenstein and her brother, Michael, spent a considerable 
amount of time with their mother and ran various errands, 
including taking care of her dogs.  Lichtenstein‘s mother, 
whose recollection of her time at the hospital was ―a little 
foggy,‖ id. at 493, testified that ―Jamie was really the 24/7 
person that would be there, and Michael would come and 
relieve her occasionally so she could run to the store and pick 
up things or stuff like that or try to make me eat something,‖ 
id. at 494.  Lichtenstein, however, did find time to work her 
shifts at UPMC on both January 4th and 5th.  During these 
shifts, Lichtenstein made no further mention of her mother‘s 
condition.  
 
On January 7th, Lidey returned from vacation.  On her 
first morning back, Lidey forwarded Harris a copy of 
                                                                                                     
96, 451–52.  Nevertheless, the adequacy of the notice she 
gave is an issue in this case. 
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Krautz‘s email from January 3rd in which Krautz apprised 
Lidey that Lichtenstein had called-off.  Above this forwarded 
message from Krautz, Lidey wrote: ―Please pull up Jamie‘s 
call offs for me.‖  Id. at 584.  In response, Harris gave Lidey a 
copy of the staff log, which included Harris‘s ―sick mom‖ 
notation in the entry for Lichtenstein‘s January 3rd absence.6  
Lidey claims she did not see this particular notation when she 
reviewed the log. 
 
In their depositions, Brown and Lidey testified that 
Lidey planned to terminate Lichtenstein on January 8th, the 
day after Lidey returned from vacation.  This plan was foiled, 
however, when Lichtenstein contacted UPMC early that 
morning to request leave to care for her mother.  At 12:18 
pm, Lichtenstein sent Lidey the following email: 
 
I am not sure if you are aware, but my mother has been 
in the hospital since Thursday [January 3rd].  I am not 
sure how much longer they will keep her hospitalized.  
And once she is released, she might require some 
assistance.  Under these circumstances and at this point 
in time, I would like to, as well as need to, take a leave 
of absence.  Who do I speak with to aid me in this 
process?   
 
Id. at 586.   
 
Lidey, who receives hundreds of emails a day, claims 
she did not read this particular email.  In fact, Lidey insists 
                                              
6
 Lidey also requested and received from Harris a copy of 
Lichtenstein‘s staff log on January 9th as well. 
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that she terminated Lichtenstein ―before I knew anything 
about her mom being ill or needing to ask for leave.‖  Id. at 
335.  This claim, however, is at odds with other evidence in 
the record, including the fact that Lidey responded to 
Lichtenstein‘s email.7  Although Lidey claims she did not 
read Lichtenstein‘s email prior to replying to it, Brown 
testified that Lidey told her Lichtenstein‘s mother was sick.  
Id. at 424.  According to Brown, ―What I recall her saying 
was that Jamie was stating that she needed to be off to care 
for her mother.‖  Id.  Brown testified that Lidey conveyed this 
information prior to Lichtenstein‘s termination. 
  
 After her termination, Lichtenstein filed a complaint 
with the EEOC alleging religious discrimination.  In 
response, UPMC sent a position statement to the EEOC in 
which it described its reasons for firing Lichtenstein.  
According to this position statement:  
 
Once Ms. Lichtenstein began working at UPMC 
Braddock, she had numerous incidents of tardiness and 
absenteeism. She was also a ‗nightmare‘ to schedule 
according to Amy Harris, the Administrative Assistant 
in charge of scheduling.  Although the hospital was 
willing to accommodate her school schedule, Ms. 
Lichtenstein was also constantly requesting days off to 
study or complete schoolwork.  By January 4, 2008, 
Ms. Lichtenstein had been absent three times 
                                              
7
 Lidey‘s reply email was not simply an automated out-of-
office reply.  In the email, Lidey stated: ―I am out of the 
office today, please call Amy to schedule a time that you can 
come in and meet with me tomorrow [January 10th].‖  Id. at 
602.   
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(including once for a sixteen hour shift) and tardy six 
times. . . .  Documentation regarding Ms. 
Lichtenstein‘s lateness, absences and scheduling issues 
is enclosed as Exhibit M. 
 
Id. at 592.  As documented in Exhibit M, one of the ―three 
absences‖ referenced in the position statement was 
Lichtenstein‘s absence on January 3rd.  Lidey‘s late 
appearance and early departure on December 30th was not 
mentioned, either in Exhibit M or the position statement. 
  
In addition to filing a claim for religious 
discrimination, Lichtenstein filed a complaint under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et 
seq.  Lichtenstein argued that her absence on January 3rd 
qualified for leave under the FMLA, and that UPMC had 
impermissibly considered this absence in terminating her 
employment.  The District Court granted UPMC‘s motion for 
summary judgment and Lichtenstein filed this timely appeal. 
  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
8
 
A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the District Court‘s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 
724, 727 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment should only be 
granted if ―there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact.‖  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute is genuine if a 
reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the non-movant.  
                                              
8
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 
(1986).  A dispute is material if it could affect the outcome of 
the case.  Id.  In considering the record, we must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, 
which in this case, is Lichtenstein.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  
 
B. FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) 
Congress passed the FMLA in 1993 in an attempt ―to 
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of 
families.‖  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).  Accordingly, the FMLA 
―entitle[s] employees to take reasonable leave for medical 
reasons,‖ 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), but employees must do so 
―in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of 
employers,‖ 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3).  Eligible employees are 
entitled to ―12 workweeks of leave during any twelve-month 
period . . . [i]n order to care for the . . . parent of the 
employee, if such . . . parent has a serious health condition.‖  
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.101(b) 
(―When a family emergency arises, . . . workers need 
reassurance that they will not be asked to choose between 
continuing their employment, and meeting their . . . family 
obligations.‖).  
  
As indicated, eligible employees are entitled to take 
FMLA if they ―care for‖ a family member with a ―serious 
health condition.‖  A ―serious health condition‖ is defined as 
―an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental 
condition that involves (A) inpatient care in a hospital, . . . or 
(B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.‖  29 
U.S.C. § 2611(11); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (defining 
inpatient care as ―an overnight stay in a hospital‖).  To ―care 
 13 
 
for‖ a family member, the employee must provide either 
physical or ―psychological care,‖ including ―psychological 
comfort and reassurance which would be beneficial to a . . . 
parent with a serious health condition who is receiving 
inpatient or home care.‖  29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a). 
   
Even when these qualifying circumstances exist, 
employees cannot invoke rights under the FMLA if they fail 
to provide adequate notice of their need for leave.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2612(e).  When the need for leave is unforeseeable,
9
 
employees are obligated to notify their employer ―as soon as 
practicable,‖ 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a), and ―provide sufficient 
information for an employer to reasonably determine whether 
the FMLA may apply,‖ 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).  
  
When employees invoke rights granted under the 
FMLA, employers may not ―interfere with, restrain, or deny 
the exercise of or attempt to exercise‖ these rights.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(a)(1).  Nor may employers ―discharge or in any other 
manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any 
practice made unlawful.‖  29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).  The 
former provision is generally, if imperfectly, referred to as 
―interference‖ whereas the latter is often referred to as 
―retaliation.‖  Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 
119 (3d Cir. 2005).  Although neither provision expressly 
forbids employers from terminating employees ―for having 
                                              
9
 See generally Cavin v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc. , 346 
F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2003) (―The regulations suggest that 
notice requirements for unforeseeable leave are more relaxed 
than the requirements for foreseeable leave, in keeping with 
the idea that an unforeseeable need for leave will often arise 
in the context of a medical emergency.‖). 
 14 
 
exercised or attempted to exercise FMLA rights,‖ a 
Department of Labor regulation has interpreted the sum of the 
two provisions as mandating this result.  See 29 CFR § 
825.220(c).  Under this regulatory interpretation, employers 
are barred from considering an employee‘s FMLA leave ―as a 
negative factor in employment actions such as hiring, 
promotions or disciplinary actions.‖10  Id.  Accordingly, an 
employee does not need to prove that invoking FMLA rights 
                                              
10
 The regulation does not specify which of the two statutory 
provisions is the specific source of this prohibition.  See 29 
CFR § 825.220(c).  Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, courts 
interpreting the regulation have reached different conclusions 
on this question.  See Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 n.9 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing cases).  As 
with the Ninth Circuit, we have predicated liability for 
retaliation based on an employee‘s exercise of FMLA rights 
on the regulation itself.  Id.  Our discussion on this point, 
however, has spurred its own share of confusion, with some 
courts citing Conoshenti as specifically locating these claims 
in 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).  See, e.g., Phillips v. Mathews, 547 
F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring).  
Adding a further wrinkle, the Department of Labor has 
subsequently amended the first sentence of 29 CFR § 
825.220(c) to include, inter alia, the words ―interference‖ and 
―retaliating.‖  See 73 Fed. Reg. 67934, 68055 (Nov. 17, 
2008); Lovland v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 674 F.3d 806, 811 
(8th Cir. 2012).  Since the parties have not briefed this matter, 
and because it does not affect the resolution of this appeal, we 
do not resolve here whether the regulation‘s amended 
language has any material impact on our reasoning in 
Conoshenti.   
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was the sole or most important factor upon which the 
employer acted. 
   
IV. ANALYSIS 
Although the gravamen of Lichtenstein‘s claim sounds 
in retaliation, she alleges both retaliation and interference 
claims.  See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 
509 (3d Cir. 2009) (―[F]iring an employee for a valid request 
for FMLA leave may constitute interference with the 
employee‘s FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the 
employee.‖).  As will be seen, both claims are closely 
intertwined. 
   
A.  RETALIATION 
To prevail on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the 
plaintiff must prove that (1) she invoked her right to FMLA-
qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse employment 
decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to 
her invocation of rights.  See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 508–09 
(modifying Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 146).  Because FMLA 
retaliation claims require proof of the employer‘s retaliatory 
intent, courts have assessed these claims through the lens of 
employment discrimination law.  Accordingly, claims based 
on circumstantial evidence have been assessed under the 
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), while claims based on 
direct evidence have been assessed under the mixed-motive 
framework set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
 16 
 
U.S. 228, 276–77 (1989) (O‘Connor, J., concurring).  See 
Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 147.
11
 
   
Although some courts have recently questioned the 
viability of mixed-motive claims under the FMLA in the 
wake of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
2343, 2349 (2009),
12
 the only federal court of appeals to rule 
on the issue has held that Gross does not preclude FMLA 
mixed-motive claims.  See Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 
579 F.3d 688, 692 (6th Cir. 2009).  The Department of Labor 
has taken a similar position, stating its view in an amicus 
brief that the FMLA continues to allow mixed-motive claims.  
See Brief for the Sec‘y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff-Appellant, Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 
F.3d 43 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 10-7073; 10-7078).  Although 
Lichtenstein calls on us to apply the mixed-motive framework 
                                              
11
 Although this Court has not specifically ruled that 
McDonnell Douglas applies to FMLA-retaliation claims 
based on circumstantial evidence, this is implied by our 
application of Price Waterhouse to claims based on direct 
evidence, Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 147, and is the prevailing 
rule of the federal courts, see, e.g., Colburn v. Parker 
Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 331–32 (1st 
Cir. 2005); Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167–
68 (2d Cir. 2004); King v. Preferred Technical Grp., 166 F.3d 
887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999).   
 
12
 See, e.g., Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 
1004 (10th Cir. 2011) (―In light of the recent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Gross .  .  . there is a 
substantial question whether a mixed motive analysis would 
apply in a retaliation claim under the FMLA.‖). 
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to her retaliation claim, she readily survives summary 
judgment under the more taxing McDonnell Douglass 
standard.  Accordingly, we proceed under McDonnell 
Douglass and leave for another day our resolution of whether 
the FMLA continues to allow mixed-motive claims in the 
wake of Gross. 
  
Under the McDonnell Douglass framework, 
Lichtenstein has the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case.  To do so, she must point to evidence in the record 
sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute about each of the 
three elements of her retaliation claim: (a) invocation of an 
FMLA right, (b) termination, and (c) causation.  See Erdman, 
582 F.3d at 508–09; Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 146.  If 
Lichtenstein can do so, the burden of production shifts to 
UPMC to ―articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason‖ for its decision.  McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S. at 
802.  If UPMC meets this minimal burden, Lichtenstein 
―must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
which a factfinder could reasonably . . . disbelieve [UPMC‘s] 
articulated legitimate reasons.‖  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
   
In its ruling below, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to UPMC based on its conclusions that Lichtenstein 
(1) failed to establish the invocation (i.e., notice) and 
causation prongs of the prima facie case, and (2) failed to 
identify evidence casting reasonable doubt on UPMC‘s 
proffered justification for her termination.  See Lichtenstein v. 
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 2d 190, 205–11 
(W.D. Pa. 2011).  We will address each of these issues in 
turn, beginning with notice. 
 18 
 
1.  Notice
13
 
 
To invoke rights under the FMLA, employees must 
provide adequate notice to their employer about their need to 
take leave.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2).  In doing so, the 
employee ―need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA 
or even mention the FMLA.‖  29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).  When 
the leave is unforeseeable, the employee‘s obligation is to 
―provide sufficient information for an employer to reasonably 
determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave 
request.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  As we have previously 
noted, this is not a formalistic or stringent standard.  See 
Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 402 
(3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the statutory and regulatory text 
suggests a ―liberal construction‖ be given to FMLA‘s notice 
requirement); see also Rask v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am., 
509 F.3d 466, 477 (8th Cir. 2007) (―The regulations already 
make it very easy for [an employee] to give notice of her 
intent to take leave.‖); Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471, 478 
                                              
13
 Our reference to UPMC in this section is limited to the three 
corporate defendants, as  Lidey was not a party to 
Lichtenstein‘s phone conversation with the nursing supervisor 
on January 3rd and there is no evidence that she was aware of 
the exact information Lichtenstein conveyed.  She later 
learned, however, from both the staff log and Lichtenstein‘s 
email to her, that Lichtenstein‘s mother had been hospitalized 
on January 3rd and that Lichtenstein had called off on the 
same day to be with her ―sick mom.‖  As set forth in our 
discussion of causation below, there is a genuine factual 
dispute as to whether Lidey had sufficient notice of 
Lichtenstein‘s FMLA leave prior to the time of the 
termination.  
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(7th Cir. 2006) (―The notice requirements of the FMLA are 
not onerous.‖). 
   
While the FMLA ―does not require an employer to be 
clairvoyant,‖ Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 
F.3d 412, 428 (6th Cir. 2004), this does not mean that 
employees need to provide every detail necessary for the 
employer to verify if the FMLA applies.  See, e.g., Ruble v. 
Am. River Transp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (E.D. Mo. 
2011) (―Plaintiff was not required to provide all the details 
necessary to show he was entitled to FMLA leave.‖).  This 
conclusion is dictated by the language of 29 C.F.R. § 
825.303(a), which provides that ―where the employer does 
not have sufficient information about the reason for an 
employee‘s use of leave, the employer should inquire further 
of the employee . . . to ascertain whether leave is potentially 
FMLA-qualifying‖ (emphasis added).  The regulations thus 
clearly envision situations where an employee can satisfy her 
notice obligation without providing enough detailed 
information for the employer to know if FMLA actually 
applies.  Accordingly, the ―critical test‖ is not whether the 
employee gave every necessary detail to determine if the 
FMLA applies, but ―how the information conveyed to the 
employer is reasonably interpreted.‖  Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 
402.  How the employee‘s notice is reasonably interpreted is 
generally a question of fact, not law.
14
  Murphy v. FedEx 
                                              
14
 There are cases, of course, where the undisputed facts are 
such that ―no rational trier of fact could conclude‖ that the 
employee‘s notice was adequate.  See, e.g., Satterfield v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 973, 980–81 (5th Cir. 1998).  In 
such cases, the adequacy of notice can be determined as a 
matter of law.   
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Nat’l. LTL, Inc., 618 F.3d 893, 903 (8th Cir. 2010); Burnett, 
472 F.3d at 479; Hopson v. Quitman Cnty. Hosp. & Nursing 
Home, Inc., 126 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1997); Cavaliere v. 
Advertising Specialty Institute Inc., --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2012 
WL 525891, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2012); Zawadowicz v. 
CVS. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 518, 529 (D.N.J. 2000); THIRD 
CIRCUIT MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL § 10.1.1 (2011).  
But see Cavin, 346 F.3d at 723 (stating Sixth Circuit‘s view 
that adequacy of notice is a question of law).  Under the 
circumstances of this case, we believe that the adequacy of 
Lichtenstein‘s notice is a question of fact. 
  
We begin by noting several facts that are not in 
dispute.  First, Lichtenstein‘s mother suffered a sudden, 
severe, and unexpected health condition on January 3, 2008 
that required staying at the hospital for over a week.  As such, 
Lichtenstein‘s mother suffered a ―serious health condition‖ 
that entitled Lichtenstein to take FMLA leave on January 3rd.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (defining ―serious health condition‖ 
as a physical condition that requires ―inpatient care‖); 29 
C.F.R. § 825.114 (defining ―inpatient care‖ as ―an overnight 
stay in a hospital‖).  Second, Lichtenstein correctly followed 
UPMC‘s call-off procedure by calling UPMC‘s nursing 
supervisor soon after arriving at the emergency room.  This is 
sufficient to establish a genuine dispute about whether 
Lichtenstein notified UPMC ―as soon as [was] practicable 
under the facts and circumstances.‖15  29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a).  
                                              
15
 Although UPMC argues in its brief that Lichtenstein failed 
to give ―advance notice‖ of her leave, br. at 34, this is belied 
by the unforeseeable nature of the emergency and UPMC‘s 
previous admissions that Lichtenstein followed proper 
procedure by calling the nursing supervisor when she did. 
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Finally, during Lichtenstein‘s telephone call with the nursing 
supervisor, Lichtenstein conveyed the following facts: (1) she 
was ―currently in the emergency room,‖ (2) her ―mother had 
been brought into the hospital via ambulance,‖ and (3) she 
―would be unable to work that day‖ (emphases added). 
 
(a) “Serious Health Condition” 
The District Court concluded that Lichtenstein 
conveyed insufficient information to the nursing supervisor to 
place UPMC on notice.  According to the District Court, the 
information was inadequate because ―the fact that a family 
member has been taken to the emergency room does not 
necessarily reflect a serious medical condition sufficient to 
support a request for leave under the FMLA.‖  Lichtenstein, 
805 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (emphasis added).  ―While the 
condition precipitating an emergency room visit may be 
serious,‖ the District Court reasoned that ―the condition might 
not require ongoing hospitalization or medical treatment.‖  Id. 
(emphases added).  In so reasoning, the District Court 
answered the wrong question.  The question is not whether 
the information conveyed to the employer necessarily rules 
out non-FMLA scenarios.  The question is whether the 
information allows an employer to ―reasonably determine 
whether the FMLA may apply.‖  29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b) 
(emphases added).  Reasonableness does not require 
certainty, and ―may‖ does not mean ―must.‖  It does not 
matter that a person rushed by ambulance to the emergency 
room ―might not‖ require inpatient care as defined under the 
FMLA.  Since many people in this situation do require such 
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care, a jury might find that reasonable notice was given under 
the circumstances.
16
 
   
Finally, in considering the adequacy of Lichtenstein‘s 
notice, we find it instructive to compare the information she 
conveyed with the guidance provided in 29 C.F.R. § 
825.303(b).
17
  According to this regulation, an employee 
                                              
16
 Despite the dissent‘s characterization to the contrary, our 
reasoning here does not dictate that a question of fact 
necessarily exists whenever an employee ―calls out from 
work saying she needs to go to the hospital.‖  Lichtenstein did 
not merely give a generic reference about going to a hospital; 
she specifically told UPMC that her mother had been taken to 
the emergency room in an ambulance.  As common sense 
would suggest, people rushed to the emergency room in an 
ambulance are generally in a more serious health situation 
than people who go on their own accord.  In fact, data from 
the United States indicate that about forty percent of people 
taken to the emergency room in an ambulance are admitted 
for inpatient care, versus just ten percent of those who ―walk 
in.‖  See Gregory Luke Larkin, et al., National Study of 
Ambulance Transports to United States Emergency 
Departments: Importance of Mental Health Problems, 21 
PREHOSPITAL & DISASTER MED. 82, 85 tbl.1 (2006).  We are 
not presented, therefore, with the kind of vague, generic 
reference to a ―hospital‖ in which the likelihood of a serious 
health condition is merely conceivable but not sufficiently 
likely to warrant shifting the burden of inquiry onto the 
employer. 
 
17
 The Department of Labor has described this regulation as 
―provid[ing] additional guidance for employees regarding 
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whose family member has a serious health condition may 
provide adequate notice by stating that the ―family member is 
under the continuing care of a health care provider,‖ or, that 
the family member has a condition that renders her ―unable to 
perform daily activities.‖  Id.  A trier-of-fact could reasonably 
conclude that the information conveyed by Lichtenstein did 
both.  Lichtenstein stated that her mother was still at the 
hospital, which implies ―continuing care,‖18 and it could be 
reasonably inferred that a person brought by ambulance to an 
emergency room and remaining at the hospital is ―unable to 
perform daily activities.‖  
  
Of course, a trier-of-fact could also consider 
Lichtenstein‘s failure to provide any further information to 
UPMC about her mother‘s condition when she returned to 
work the very next day.  Lichtenstein was not necessarily 
obligated, however, to provide additional information.  The 
regulations state that if an employee‘s initial notice 
reasonably apprises the employer that FMLA may apply, it is 
the employer‘s burden to request additional information if 
                                                                                                     
what is ‗sufficient information‘‖ to constitute notice.  U.S. 
Dep‘t of Labor, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 
About the Revisions to the Family and Medical Leave Act, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/finalrule/NonMilitaryFAQs.ht
m (last visited July 9, 2012). 
 
18
 Since the regulation refers to ―continuing care‖ rather than 
―continuing treatment,‖ the DOL‘s definition of ―continuing 
treatment‖ is not necessarily applicable.  See 29 C.F.R. § 
825.115(a) (stating that ―continual treatment‖ requires ―[a] 
period of incapacity of more than three consecutive, full 
calendar days‖). 
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necessary.  29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a).  Thus, since we believe 
there is a genuine dispute about whether Lichtenstein‘s phone 
call to the nursing supervisor met this standard, her failure to 
provide further information on the following day at work does 
not defeat her claim at this stage.  
 
 (b) “To Care For” 
UPMC contends that Lichtenstein‘s notice was 
deficient because it failed to provide sufficient information 
from which UPMC could infer she would ―care for‖ her 
mother.  UPMC‘s arguments on this issue wholly miss the 
point.  As previously stated, FMLA regulations define the 
term ―to care for‖ as ―encompass[ing] both physical and 
psychological care,‖ including the provision of 
―psychological comfort and reassurance which would be 
beneficial to a . . . parent with a serious health condition who 
is receiving inpatient or home care.‖  29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a).  
We assess the adequacy of Lichtenstein‘s notice, therefore, by 
considering whether UPMC could have reasonably inferred 
she would provide  ―psychological comfort and reassurance‖ 
to her mother.  
 
UPMC claims that Lichtenstein ―provided no 
indication that she was needed to care for her mother—only 
that her mother had been transported to the hospital.‖  Br. at 
36.  It is undisputed, however, that Lichtenstein told UPMC 
she was ―currently in the emergency room‖ with her mother 
and ―unable to work that day.‖  A reasonable fact-finder 
could infer from these statements that Lichtenstein was 
asking for leave to care for her mother.  UPMC implicitly 
conceded this point at oral argument when it stated that 
staying and caring for one‘s mother under such circumstances 
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―would be a natural thing to do.‖  If it was ―a natural thing to 
do,‖ it was certainly reasonable for UPMC to infer.  It matters 
not that UPMC received no ―doctor‘s opinion or report that 
the mother for some emotional reasons required the presence 
of the plaintiff at the hospital.‖  An employer does not need a 
doctor‘s report to realize that a person rushed to the hospital 
in an ambulance will likely receive ―psychological comfort 
and reassurance‖ by the presence of their loved ones.  See 
Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enterprises, LLC, 270 
F.Supp.2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (―By the very terms of 
the FMLA regulations, a child‘s offering comfort and 
reassurance to a bedridden parent qualifies as ‗caring for‘ the 
parent.‖).  
  
Similarly it does not matter that UPMC did not know 
if Lichtenstein was an ―only child,‖ or if there were ―other 
family members‖ at the hospital.19  The FMLA regulations 
expressly state that ―[t]he employee need not be the only 
individual or family member available to care for the family 
member.‖  29 CFR § 825.124(b); see also Romans v. Mich. 
Dep’t of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 840–41 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(stating that ―plain language of the regulations‖ entitles an 
employee to FMLA leave even when other relatives are 
available to care for the sick family member). 
 
                                              
19
 At oral argument, UPMC argued that it could not have been 
expected to know that Lichtenstein would take care of her 
mother because ―there‘s no evidence in this record that the 
plaintiff is an only child, that there‘s no other family members 
there, who else was at the hospital to give nurture, or any of 
that type of information.‖ 
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Finally, there is no merit to UPMC‘s argument that 
Lichtenstein‘s January 8th letter made it reasonable for 
UPMC to infer that Lichtenstein did not provide care for her 
mother on January 3rd.  The logic of UPMC‘s argument is as 
follows: (A) since Lichtenstein‘s January 8th letter stated that 
she needed to care for her mother after her mother left the 
hospital, ergo (B) ―she wasn‘t needed to care for her mother 
while her mother was in the hospital.‖  There is nothing 
inherently contradictory, however, about asking to care for 
one‘s seriously ill parent both during and after their hospital 
stay.  Indeed, the FMLA regulations expressly define ―to care 
for‖ as including both care provided at home and the hospital.  
See 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a) (stating that care includes 
―providing psychological comfort and reassurance which 
would be beneficial to a . . . parent with a serious health 
condition who is receiving inpatient or home care‖ (emphases 
added)).  UPMC‘s logic thus relies on a cramped notion of 
what it means ―to care for‖ under the FMLA.  
 
For the reasons stated, a genuine factual dispute exists 
about whether Lichtenstein provided adequate notice to 
timely and reasonably apprise UPMC that the FMLA may 
apply to her request for leave.  A trier-of-fact considering this 
question would be entitled to consider the ―totality of the 
circumstances,‖ Rynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188, 1196 
(8th Cir. 2011), including—but not limited to—evidence 
shedding light on Lichtenstein‘s credibility and Lichtenstein‘s 
pattern of conduct during and following January 3rd, 
including her failure to mention her mother‘s condition when 
she returned to work on January 4th as well as her email to 
Lidey on January 8th.  
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2. Causation 
 
Having determined that a genuine factual dispute 
exists with respect to the notice prong of Lichtenstein‘s prima 
facie case, we now consider the question of causation.  To 
demonstrate a prima facie case of causation, Lichtenstein 
must point to evidence sufficient to create an inference that a 
causative link exists between her FMLA leave and her 
termination.  See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 
271, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2000).  When the ―temporal proximity‖ 
between the protected activity and adverse action is ―unduly 
suggestive,‖ this ―is sufficient standing alone to create an 
inference of causality and defeat summary judgment.‖  
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 
232 (3d Cir. 2007).  ―Where the temporal proximity is not 
‗unusually suggestive,‘ we ask whether ‗the proffered 
evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the 
inference.‘‖  Id. (quoting Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280).  
  
Here, Lichtenstein was terminated on January 10th, 
just seven days after she invoked her right to FMLA leave, 
and just three days after Lidey returned from vacation.  Had 
things gone according to UPMC‘s plan, even less time would 
have elapsed.  Both Lidey and Brown testified that Lidey‘s 
plan was to fire Lichtenstein on January 8th (the first day 
Lidey and Lichtenstein were scheduled to work the same shift 
following Lidey‘s return from vacation).  ―Although there is 
no bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive 
temporal proximity,‖ id. at 233, the temporal proximity in this 
case is in the realm of what this Court and others have found 
sufficient at the prima facie stage, see, e.g.,  Jalil v. Avdel 
Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding two days 
unduly suggestive); Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 
 28 
 
F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (three weeks); Wierman v. 
Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 994 (8th Cir. 2011) (four 
days); cf. McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th Cir. 
2008) (five days in Title VII retaliation case). 
  
Even if the temporal proximity in this case is not 
unduly suggestive, there is other evidence from which an 
inference of causation can be drawn.  UPMC‘s position 
statement to the EEOC, for example, specifically listed 
Lichtenstein‘s January 3rd leave as one of her three absences.  
Since UPMC‘s position statement stated that Lichtenstein‘s 
attendance problems were one of the reasons it terminated 
Lichtenstein, a trier-of-fact could infer that UPMC considered 
Lichtenstein‘s January 3rd absence as a negative factor in its 
termination decision.  This inference is supported by other 
evidence in the record.  Specifically, when Lidey returned to 
work on January 7th, she responded to Krautz‘s email (the 
one in which Krautz reported Lichtenstein‘s call-off on 
January 3rd) by requesting Lichtenstein‘s call-off records 
from Harris.  From this, a trier-of-fact could infer that Lidey‘s 
decision to request Lichtenstein‘s call-off records, and ergo 
Lidey‘s decision that day to terminate Lichtenstein, was 
triggered by Lidey learning of the January 3rd absence. 
   
We recognize that since Krautz‘s email made no 
mention of Lichtenstein‘s reason for calling off, it does not 
necessarily follow that Lidey knew Lichtenstein‘s absence 
was likely protected under the FMLA.  Cf. Moore v. City of 
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (―To the 
extent that [Title VII plaintiff] relies upon the brevity of the 
time periods between the protected activity and alleged 
retaliatory actions to prove causation, he will have to show as 
well that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected 
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activity.‖ (internal citations omitted)).  There is other 
evidence in the record, however, from which this inference 
could reasonably be drawn.  See Cavaliere, 2012 WL 525891, 
at *12 (finding plaintiff‘s circumstantial evidence sufficient to 
infer decision maker‘s awareness of her FMLA leave).  Most 
tellingly, Lidey received a personal email from Lichtenstein 
the following day which explicitly stated that Lichtenstein‘s 
mother had been hospitalized on January 3rd and had 
remained hospitalized ever since.  Moreover, Lichtenstein‘s 
staff log—which Lidey requested and received from Harris 
on both January 7th and 9th—included a notation that 
Lichtenstein missed work on the 3rd because of her ―sick 
mom.‖  Taken together, these two facts provide a sufficient 
basis from which to infer that by the time Lidey terminated 
Lichtenstein, she was on notice that Lichtenstein‘s January 
3rd absence may be protected under the FMLA. 
   
Although Lidey now claims she never read 
Lichtenstein‘s email nor saw the ―sick mom‖ notation on the 
staff log, a reasonable trier-of-fact could find these claims 
unworthy of credence.  First, Lidey did not merely receive 
Lichtenstein‘s email; she replied to it.  Second, Lidey did not 
merely receive the staff log, she specifically requested it—not 
once, but twice.  Third, Lidey‘s insistence that she did not 
know of Lichtenstein‘s mother‘s illness20 is directly 
                                              
20
 In her deposition, Lidey stated: ―I terminated Jamie by 
telephone [on January 10, 2008] before I knew anything 
about her mom being ill or needing to ask for leave.‖  App. at 
335.  When confronted with the email she received from 
Lichtenstein that contained this information, Lidey testified, 
―I did not see that.‖  Id.  When confronted with the fact that 
she twice requested and received Lichtenstein‘s staff log 
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contradicted by Brown‘s deposition.  According to Brown: 
―What I recall [Lidey] saying was that Jamie was stating that 
she needed to be off to care for her mother.‖  App. at 424.  
Thus, even if there is insufficient evidence to show Lidey‘s 
knowledge of Lichtenstein‘s protected activity when she 
returned to work on January 7th, any benefit of this ignorance 
was lost when Lidey received Lichtenstein‘s email the next 
day.
21
  See Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 231 F.3d 
791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000) (―[T]he plaintiff must generally 
show that the decision maker was aware of the protected 
conduct at the time of the adverse employment action.‖ 
(emphasis added)). 
 
In its brief, UPMC argues that any inference of 
causation is defeated by Lidey‘s claim that she decided to 
terminate Lichtenstein prior to January 3rd.  This argument is 
unavailing because, as discussed below in our analysis of 
pretext, Lichtenstein has established a genuine dispute about 
the date of UPMC‘s termination decision and whether it 
occurred before or after January 3rd.
22
  UPMC claims, for 
                                                                                                     
(which contained the note about Lichtenstein‘s mother being 
sick on January 3rd), Lidey responded, ―[i]t doesn‘t mean that 
I looked at that, and I was, I don‘t believe I looked at it at that 
point in time.‖  Id.    
 
21
 Although Lichtenstein‘s email did not specifically state that 
she missed work on January 3rd because of her mother‘s 
hospitalization, Lidey was aware from the staff log that 
Lichtenstein‘s January 3rd absence was a result of her mom 
being sick. 
 
22
 A similar limitation applies to the District Court‘s causation 
analysis, the conclusion of which was dictated by its finding 
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example, that Lidey decided to fire Lichtenstein for arriving 
late and leaving early on December 30th.  UPMC‘s position 
statement to the EEOC, however, made no mention of this 
incident as a factor in its decision, and Lidey could not even 
recall when she learned about it.  A trier-of-fact could infer 
from this that UPMC did not discover the December 30th 
incident until sometime after Lichtenstein‘s termination.  A 
post hoc ground for termination, while potentially relevant to 
the calculation of damages, is ―irrelevant‖ to the question of 
causation.  Brenneman, 366 F.3d at 416 n.2.  Accordingly, at 
this stage, UPMC does not benefit from the principle that 
employers need not suspend plans to discipline an employee 
upon discovering that said employee engaged in protected 
activity on matters unrelated to the contemplated action.  See 
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001) 
(establishing this principle in the Title VII context); Salameh 
v. Sears Holding Mgt. Corp., No. 08 C 4372, 2010 WL 
183361 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2010) (applying principle to the 
FMLA context).  
 
For all of the abovementioned reasons, we believe 
Lichtenstein has presented sufficient evidence to establish a 
                                                                                                     
that Lichtenstein had not invoked her right to FMLA leave on 
January 3rd.  Since this removed Lichtenstein‘s January 3rd 
absence from FMLA‘s protections, the District Court 
regarded any and all considerations of this absence irrelevant 
to causation.  Thus, because ―the wheels of [Lichtenstein‘s] 
termination were already in motion‖ by January 8th, the 
District Court concluded that Lichtenstein failed to 
demonstrate a causative link.  Lichtenstein, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 
213. 
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prima facie case of causation.  This evidence, when drawing 
all reasonable inferences in Lichtenstein‘s favor, is sufficient 
for a fact-finder to conclude: (1) Lidey‘s decision to terminate 
Lichtenstein was triggered by the January 3rd absence; (2) 
prior to terminating Lichtenstein, Lidey learned that the 
January 3rd absence was likely taken for an FMLA-
qualifying reason; and (3) by proceeding with the termination, 
Lidey considered Lichtenstein‘s FMLA activity a ―negative 
factor‖ that further justified the termination.  
 
3. Pretext  
 We now address the legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons that UPMC has articulated for terminating 
Lichtenstein and consider whether Lichtenstein has 
established reasonable doubt that this proffered justification is 
mere pretext for retaliation.  
   
According to UPMC, Lichtenstein was terminated 
because of her chronic tardiness and absenteeism, with the 
―last straw‖ being her late appearance and early departure on 
December 30th.  Br. at 43.  Specifically, UPMC states that: 
 
[T]he decision to terminate Plaintiff‘s employment 
was made after Plaintiff, despite being expressly told 
that she was to report for her scheduled shift on 
December 30, 2007, decided to make her own 
schedule by arriving very late and leaving very early.  
In fact, the decision was made prior to Ms. Lidey 
leaving the office for vacation on December 30, 2007.  
Indeed, Ms. Lidey spoke to Helene Brown about the 
decision to terminate Plaintiff prior to January 1, 2008 
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and Ms. Brown concurred in that decision. 
 
Id. at 15 (internal citations omitted).  UPMC thus claims that 
―[n]either the January 3, 2008 nor January 8, 2008 absences 
were taken into account‖ in the termination decision.  Id. 
 
 In order to demonstrate that UPMC‘s proffered 
justification for terminating her is merely pretextual, 
Lichtenstein ―must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably . . . 
disbelieve the employer‘s articulated legitimate reasons.‖  
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.  To do so, Lichtenstein ―must 
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [UPMC‘s] 
proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable 
factfinder could rationally find them ‗unworthy of credence.‘‖  
Id. at 765.  Notwithstanding the District Court‘s conclusion to 
the contrary, we believe Lichtenstein has met this burden.  To 
begin with, Lichtenstein has presented evidence that 
contradicts UPMC‘s two key assertions that (1) the December 
30th incident was the ―final‖ straw that triggered 
Lichtenstein‘s termination, and (2) Lidey made the 
termination decision prior to Lichtenstein‘s absence on 
January 3rd. 
 
First, while UPMC claims that the December 30th 
incident was the ―final straw‖ triggering Lichtenstein‘s 
termination, a trier-of-fact could reasonably infer that UPMC 
was not even aware of this incident prior to terminating 
Lichtenstein.  This inference can be drawn from the following 
evidence: (A) Lidey could not recollect when she first learned 
about the December 30th incident, (B) UPMC did not cite the 
incident as a factor in the termination decision in its 
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explanation to the EEOC; and (C) the incident was not 
included in Lichtenstein‘s staff log that Lidey can be inferred 
to have reviewed prior to firing her. 
  
Second, the only evidence showing Lidey decided to 
fire Lichtenstein prior to going on leave is Lidey‘s own 
testimony.  This is important because Lidey contradicted 
herself on this very point.  At least twice during her 
deposition Lidey stated that she couldn‘t recall if she made 
the termination decision prior to going on vacation.  
Similarly, although Lidey stated that she always spoke with 
Brown prior to firing an employee, she testified at least three 
times during her deposition that she could not recall if she 
spoke with Brown before or after going on vacation.  These 
contradictions go to the very core of UPMC‘s proffered 
reason for terminating Lichtenstein.  They also ―raise 
suspicions‖ about Lidey‘s credibility.  See Bray v. Marriott 
Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1997) (―An inference of 
pretext may arise if the plaintiff can raise suspicions with 
respect to the defendant's credibility . . . .‖).  Not only did 
Lidey repeatedly contradict herself on the timing of her 
decision, substantial evidence contradicts her assertion that 
she did not know Lichtenstein‘s mother was ill.23  Since 
                                              
23
 This evidence includes: (1) Brown‘s testimony that Lidey 
told her about Lichtenstein‘s mother‘s illness prior to 
terminating Lichtenstein, (2) Lidey‘s request and receipt of 
Lichtenstein‘s staff log in which the words ―sick mom‖ were 
clearly written in the entry for the January 3rd absence, and 
(3) Lidey‘s receipt of and reply to Lichtenstein‘s email in 
which Lichtenstein had discussed her mother‘s 
hospitalization. 
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Lidey‘s testimony is the only evidence showing that the 
termination decision was made prior to January 3rd, a trier-
of-fact would be justified in giving this evidence little 
evidentiary weight. 
  
In the opinion below, however, the District Court 
reasoned that Lidey‘s contradictions were immaterial because 
they merely pertained to the timing of UPMC‘s decision (i.e., 
whether Lidey made the decision before or after she went on 
vacation), not to her proffered justification for doing so (i.e., 
Lichtenstein‘s attendance and scheduling problems).  
According to the District Court, ―Ms. Lidey‘s testimony does 
not offer inconsistent reasons for Ms. Lichtenstein‘s 
termination; the reason is consistently her attendance and 
scheduling problems.‖24  Lichtenstein, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 209.  
The District Court‘s reasoning is flawed.  The question is not 
whether UPMC discharged Lichtenstein for absenteeism and 
tardiness; the question is whether Lichtenstein‘s FMLA-
qualifying leave on January 3rd was a ―negative factor‖ that 
hastened her termination.  29 CFR § 825.220(c); see also 
Cavin, 346 F.3d at 726 (―[A] termination based only in part 
on an absence covered by the FMLA, even in combination 
with other absences, may still violate the FMLA.‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  The timing of UPMC‘s decision 
is thus critical to determining whether UPMC relied solely on 
the pre-January 3rd incidents, or whether it also considered 
the January 3rd absence as an additional negative factor.   
                                              
24
 The District Court reasoned that Lidey‘s testimony ―is not 
so much inconsistent as it is vague as to the date on which 
certain events took place three years earlier.‖ Lichtenstein, 
805 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
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The importance of timing to the question of pretext 
was illustrated by the Seventh Circuit in Kohls v. Beverly 
Enterprises Wisconsin, Inc., 259 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001).  In 
Kohls, the employee engaged in behavior prior to taking 
FMLA leave that was clearly sufficient to warrant her 
termination.  259 F.3d at 805.  The Seventh Circuit noted, 
however, that there was ―an additional twist‖ to the case 
because the employer ―did not decide to fire Kohls until some 
time after she took leave.‖  Id.  This was important, the 
Seventh Circuit explained, because: 
 
We can imagine circumstances in which the timing of 
this decision could lead a fact finder to infer that the 
employee would not have been fired absent her taking 
of leave (if, for example, a supervisor who had been 
aware of problems with an employee did not decide to 
fire the employee until she took leave, and the 
supervisor based the firing on the incidents of which 
the employer had already been aware). 
 
Id. at 806.  Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment for the employer, it did so because the record was 
―clear‖ that ―the employer did not discover many of the 
deficiencies in [the employee‘s] work . . . until after [the 
employee] took leave.‖  Id.  (emphases added). 
   
As with the employee in Kohls, Lichtenstein engaged 
in behavior that was undoubtedly sufficient for UPMC to 
terminate her employment (i.e., attendance and scheduling 
problems during a probationary period in which a progressive 
disciplinary policy did not apply).  In sharp contrast, 
however, to the situation in Kohls, the record here is clear 
(with the exception of the December 30th incident) that 
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UPMC was aware of Lichtenstein‘s performance deficiencies 
prior to her taking leave on January 3rd.  Despite this 
knowledge, UPMC did not fire Lichtenstein until after she 
took her January 3rd leave.  Although UPMC insists that the 
timing can be explained by the simple fact that Lidey left for 
vacation on December 31st and did not have an opportunity 
to fire Lichtenstein prior to January 3rd, Lidey‘s own 
testimony raises significant doubts about this explanation.  
Indeed, Lidey herself could not remember when she made the 
decision to terminate Lidey, nor could she remember when 
she learned of the December 30th incident that purportedly 
prompted this decision. 
   
We believe, therefore, that Lichtenstein has met her 
burden of demonstrating pretext because, as per the Seventh 
Circuit‘s reasoning, ―the timing of [UPMC‘s] decision could 
lead a fact finder to infer that [Lichtenstein] would not have 
been fired absent her taking of leave.‖  Id.; accord Moorer v. 
Baptist Mem’l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 488–90 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (―The record . . . shows that [the employer] was 
aware of many of Moorer‘s alleged performance deficiencies 
prior to his FMLA leave, thereby casting doubt on the timing 
of the purported reasons for his termination.‖). 
 
B. INTERFERENCE 
  
By terminating her employment for having invoked 
her right to FMLA leave, Lichtenstein argues UPMC 
unlawfully interfered with her rights in violation of 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(a)(1).  See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 509 (―[F]iring an 
employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute 
interference with the employee‘s FMLA rights as well as 
 38 
 
retaliation against the employee.‖).25  To prevail on her 
interference claim, Lichtenstein must show (1) she was 
entitled to take FMLA leave on January 3rd and/or January 
8th, and (2) UPMC denied her right to do so.  See Callison, 
430 F.3d at 119. 
   
In proving that UPMC interfered with her rights, 
Lichtenstein does not need to prove that UPMC acted with 
discriminatory intent.  Sommer v. The Vanguard Group, 461 
F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 2006); Callison, 430 F.3d at 120.  The 
FMLA, however, ―does not provide employees with a right 
against termination for a reason other than interference with 
rights under the FMLA.‖  Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 403.  
                                              
25
 It is not clear to us that Erdman necessarily guarantees that 
plaintiffs have an automatic right to claim interference where, 
as here, the claim is so clearly redundant to the retaliation 
claim.  In recent years, several federal courts of appeals have 
affirmed dismissal of interference claims that— although not 
necessarily analogous to Lichtenstein‘s claim here—were 
duplicative of the plaintiffs‘ retaliation claims.  E.g., Lovland, 
674 F.3d at 811–12; Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., 
681 F.3d 274, 282–83 (6th Cir. 2012); Stallings v. Hussmann 
Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1051 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Atchison 
v. Sears, 666 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2009) 
(―[Plaintiff‘s] interference claim is identical to his retaliation 
claim, and premised on the same allegation . . . .  He cannot 
escape the McDonnell Douglas analysis to prove his case 
merely by affixing an ‗interference‘ label to one of his 
duplicative claims. Thus, [plaintiff‘s] FMLA violation 
allegations should be analyzed as a retaliation claim.‖). Since 
this issue was not raised below nor presented on appeal, we 
do not address it here.  
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UPMC, therefore, can defeat Lichtenstein‘s claim if it can 
demonstrate that Lichtenstein was terminated for reasons 
―unrelated to‖ her exercise of rights.  Id.; accord Ballato v. 
Comcast Corp., 676 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2012) (―If there 
exists a showing of interference, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove there was a reason unrelated to the 
employee‘s exercise of FMLA rights for terminating the 
employee.‖); Michniewicz v. Metasource, LLC, 756 
F.Supp.2d 657, 666 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (―The employee bears the 
initial burden of showing both elements of the interference 
claim, and then the burden shifts to the employer . . . .‖).  
Whether or not UPMC will be able to meet its burden, we 
have no trouble concluding—for the reasons set forth in our 
retaliation analysis above—that Lichtenstein has met her 
burden at this stage in the litigation. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court‘s grant of summary judgment to UPMC on both the 
retaliation and interference claims and remand to the District 
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, Dissenting 
Pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., an employee may 
qualify for unforeseen FMLA leave only by providing an 
employer with notice that contains “sufficient information for 
an employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may 
apply to the leave request.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c).  
Congress included this notice requirement in order to balance 
the employee’s entitlement to “reasonable leave” with the 
“legitimate interests of employers.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2); 
see Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass GmbH, 359 F.3d 950, 951 
(7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“Conditioning the right to take 
FMLA leave on the employee’s giving the required notice to 
his employer is the quid pro quo for the employer’s partial 
surrender of control over his work force.”).  In keeping with 
the purpose and language of the FMLA, I would hold as a 
matter of law that Ms. Lichtenstein failed to provide adequate 
notice that the FMLA applied to her January 3, 2008 absence, 
and I would affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
(“UPMC”).  For the reasons given below, and despite Judge 
Van Antwerpen’s well-crafted opinion, I respectfully dissent. 
For her interference and retaliation claims to survive 
summary judgment, Lichtenstein must introduce evidence 
that she was entitled to FMLA benefits.  Hayduk v. City of 
Johnstown, 386 F. App’x 55, 60 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he first 
elements of both theories [i.e., interference and retaliation] 
are essentially identical: a plaintiff . . . must establish, among 
other things, that he had a right to FMLA benefits.”).  To 
establish that entitlement, Lichtenstein must demonstrate that 
she gave her employer adequate notice of the need for FMLA 
leave.  See id.  Federal regulations require that an employee 
“state a qualifying reason for the needed leave.”  29 C.F.R. 
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§ 825.301(b).  When the need for leave is unforeseeable, 
employees must give notice “as soon as practicable under the 
facts and circumstances of the particular case” and according 
to the employer’s “usual and customary notice and procedural 
requirements.”  Id. § 825.303(a) & (c).  The employee “need 
not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention 
the FMLA,” but must “provide sufficient information for an 
employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may 
apply to the leave request.”  Id. § 825.303(b).  Compare 
Sarnowski v. Air Brook Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 402 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“In providing notice, the employee need not 
use any magic words.”), with Hayduk v. City of Johnstown, 
580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 471 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“The FMLA does 
not require an employer to be clairvoyant.” (quoting 
Brenneman v. MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 428 
(6th Cir. 2004)).  The employer may have a duty to “inquire 
further . . . to ascertain whether leave is potentially FMLA-
qualifying,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(a), but that duty only arises 
when the employee provides adequate notice.  See Wilson v. 
Lemington Home for the Aged, 159 F. Supp. 2d 186, 192 
(W.D. Pa. 2001); De Luca v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 834 
F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
Lichtenstein contends that she gave proper notice 
when she called off on January 3 and told the nursing 
supervisor, “I was currently in the emergency room, that my 
mother had been brought into the hospital via ambulance, and 
I would be unable to work that day.”  I agree with my 
colleagues that the notice issue is generally a question of fact 
and “the critical test is not whether the employee gave every 
necessary detail to determine if the FMLA applies, but how 
the information conveyed to the employer is reasonably 
interpreted.”  Id. at 16 (quotation marks & citation omitted).  
However, I cannot agree that “genuine factual disputes exist 
about whether Lichtenstein’s notice was adequate.”  Maj. Op. 
at 21.  
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Lichtenstein did not state a qualifying reason for her 
January 3 absence because she failed to mention essential 
details that were critical for adequate notice, namely the 
seriousness of her mother’s condition and her mother’s need 
for care.  Lichtenstein conveyed to UPMC that her mother 
was at the hospital, but not that her mother was suffering 
from a serious health condition.  According to the majority, 
Lichtenstein’s notice might have been sufficient because 
“many people in [her mother’s] situation do require [FMLA-
qualifying] care.”  Maj. Op. at 19 (emphasis in text).  This 
view imposes on employers a much broader obligation than, I 
believe, the FMLA requires.  
Consider, for example, an employee who calls out 
from work saying she needs to go to the hospital.  Whether 
that employee is going to the hospital for an emergency 
procedure, a routine check-up, or just to pick up a friend, the 
majority’s reasoning dictates that the notice cannot be 
designated inadequate as a matter of law because “many 
people in this situation” require care for a serious health 
condition.  Indeed, simply calling out “sick” would qualify as 
sufficient notice under the majority’s reading of the FMLA 
had the Department of Labor not adopted an explicit rule to 
the contrary.  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b).  “If you have brain 
cancer but just tell your employer that you have a headache, 
you have not given the notice that the Act requires.”  
Aubuchon, 359 F.3d at 952.
1
  The majority’s lenient reading 
                                              
1
 The Seventh Circuit Court requires that an employee’s 
notice “give the employer enough information to establish 
probable cause, as it were, to believe that he is entitled to 
FMLA leave.”  Id. at 953; but see Scobey v. Nucor Steel-Ark., 
580 F.3d 781, 788 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying a more lenient 
notice standard).  I do not address whether that is the 
appropriate standard to apply to notice questions in FMLA 
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of the notice requirement distorts the balance Congress and 
the Department of Labor struck between employee and 
employer interests, and improperly “place[s] a substantial and 
largely wasted investigative burden on employers.”  Id. at 
953.  
Lichtenstein also conveyed to UPMC that she needed 
the day off, but not that the day off was necessary to care for 
her mother.  Though UPMC conceded that caring for one’s 
mother under such circumstances “would be a natural thing to 
do,” Maj. Op. 21, empathy cannot make up for Lichtenstein’s 
failure to mention an FMLA-qualifying reason for her 
absence.  See Aubuchon, 359 F.3d at 952 (“Wanting to stay 
home with one's wife until she has the baby, while 
understandable, is not the same thing as wanting to stay home 
to care for a spouse who has a serious health condition.”). 
In addition to omitting critical details from her 
statements to the nursing supervisor, Lichtenstein failed to 
provide notice “as soon as practicable.”  See 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.303(a).  She returned to work on January 4—while her 
mother was still in the hospital—and did not notify a 
supervisor about her mother’s serious health condition.  
Lichtenstein even testified at her deposition that she first 
asked for FMLA leave on January 8, not January 3.  App. at 
66 (“The first time that I asked [for leave] . . . [w]as January 8 
of 2008.”).  Even if her request for leave on January 8 was 
made “as soon as practicable,” which it was not, the direct 
evidence in the record indicates only that the decision was 
made to terminate Lichtenstein before the 8th.  See App. at 
345 (Lidey testifying that the decision was made “before New 
Year’s”); 423-424 (Brown testifying that the decision “had to 
be [made] prior to January 8th”).  Lichtenstein argues that the 
                                                                                                     
cases, but we should be aware of the important considerations 
that led the Seventh Circuit to adopt it. 
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decision may have been made “on or after January 7,” 
Lichtenstein Br. at 17, but she only cites non-probative 
circumstantial evidence to support her claim.  See id. at 14 
(citing App. at 331 (Lidey testifying that she “discussed 
[Lichtenstein’s call-offs] with Human Resource” on January 
7)).  Lichtenstein cites no direct evidence that the decision 
was made after the 8th and does not address Brown’s 
testimony. 
 There are situations in which an employee provides 
sufficient notice to trigger an employer’s duty to inquire, but 
this is not one of them.  See Satterfield v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 135 F.3d 973, 978-91 (5th Cir. 1998) (rehearing and 
rehearing en banc denied) (holding, as a matter of law, that an 
employee’s statement that she “was having a lot of pain and . 
. . wouldn’t make it in to work that day” provided insufficient 
notice to her employer under the FMLA).  That Lichtenstein’s 
statements might reasonably be construed as providing 
adequate notice is a bridge too far.  If notice is adequate when 
an employer can “reasonably determine whether the FMLA 
may apply,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c), then we should find that 
notice is inadequate when, as in this case, an employee omits 
vital pieces of information that would distinguish FMLA 
leave from an ordinary absence.  
 If Lichtenstein’s statements could reasonably be 
interpreted as sufficient notice of her need for FMLA leave, I 
would join my colleagues and reverse the grant of summary 
judgment.  However, I believe that the statements are 
insufficient as a matter of law.  Thus I respectfully dissent. 
